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Bhāviveka on pratyakṣa 
Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā Ⅲ and his commentary Tarkajvālā 
Naoya Kaneko, Tsukuba University 
 
1. Introduction1 
  The Mādhyamika school, who succeeded to the thought of Nāgārjuna (ca.150〜250) rephrased 
the selflessness of all dharmas (sarvadharmanairātmyatā), a basic doctrine of Buddhism since 
Śākyamuṇi, as the absence of things' own nature (niḥsvabhāvatā), identified by it with the 
empty/emptiness (śūnya/śūnyatā) of Mahāyana sūtra. Bhāviveka (ca.500〜570), who represents the 
Mādhyamika school in the 6th century attempted to prove this emptiness with the logic established 
by the Buddhist logician Dignāga (ca. 480~540), while accepting also Dignāga's definition of direct 
perception (pratyakṣa) which seems to be based on the existence of the own nature (svabhāva) of 
things. According to Dignāga's definition, pratyakṣa arises in the first stage of cognition, perceives 
the own nature/characteristic (svabhāva/svalakṣaṇa) of things and is a cognition free from 
conceptual construction (nirvikalpa/avikalpa) i.e. without any conceptual cognition2. Bhāviveka 
too accepts this definition of pratyakṣa3. 
                                            
1 The material of this article was first presented at the 37th Conference of Tsukuba University Association for 
Studies in Philosophy and Thought (Tsukuba Daigaku Tetsugaku Shisou Gakkai), 2016. I revised and corrected the 
original paper in some ways. My special thanks are due to Professor Turfas Liana for correcting my English and 
giving useful suggetions. 
2 Dignāga eventually takes the position of mind only (vijñaptimātra), but maintains the following view as a 
definition of direct perception. Cf. svalakṣaṇaviṣayaṃ ca pratyakṣaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayaṃ anumānam iti 
pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ. ... svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ hy avyapadeśyavarṇatvābhyāṃ varṇādi gṛhītvānityatayā cānityaṃ 
varṇādīti manasā sandhatte. ... tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhaṃ (I.3c) yasya jñānasya kalpanā nāsti, tat 
pratyakṣam. PSV 1.19-2.8 ad PSI 
Tr: And we shall explain that direct perception has the own characteristic [of things] as its object, and inference has 
the universal characteristic as its object. ... [In the case of cognition,] one cognizes color etc. from the point of the 
ineffable (avyapadeśya) own characteristic and the universal characteristic, color-ness (varṇatva). Then, by means 
of the operation of the mind ( manas) one relates [the color-ness] to [the universal,] noneternity ( anityatā), and 
expresses "the color etc are noneternal.". ... Among these [two means of cognition], direct perception is free from 
conceptual construction ( kalpanā). (I.3c) The cognition in which there is no conceptual construction is direct 
perception. 
3 Cf. mngon sum gyi shes pa dngos po'i rang gi mtshan nyid tsam la dmigs pa rtog (DC : rtogs P) pa dang rjes su 
dran pa'i rnam par rtog pa dang bral bas | gzugs la sogs pa sngon po la sogs pa'i bdag nyid du bstan du (DC : bstan 
du lacking in P) med pa'i ngo bo nyid la | de bzhin du med pa'i ngo bo nyid kho na bzhin du rang rig pa'i rnam pas 
rtogs par byed pa ... TJ ad MHKⅤ.26cd[D207a4-5]  
Tr: Perceptual cognition cognizes only the own characteristic of things and is free from conceptualization and 
recollection as a conceptual cognition. Thus, [this cognition] understands the own nature of ineffable form (*rūpa) 
etc., which has the nature of blue etc., as itself without any [verbal expression] by means of self-cognition. ; 
  Own nature (svabhāva) and own characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) have the same meaning. Bhāviveka explains the own 
nature which is in MHK as own characteristic in TJ. 
Cf. kharasvabhāvā na mahī bhūtatvāt tadyathānilaḥ |  
   dhāraṇaṃ na bhuvaḥ kāryaṃ kṛtakatvād yathāmbhasaḥ || (MHKⅢ .27)  
zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras te | 'jig rten dang chos mngon pa la sogs pa'i bstan bcos las sa'i mtshan nyid ni sra ba 
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  Is it then possible to maintain at the same time both the absence/emptiness of things' own nature 
and the theory of direct perception based on the own nature of things? Relying on the theory of two 
truths (satyadvaya) that each thing has its own nature on the level of this world but there is no own 
nature on the level of ultimate reality, Bhāviveka states that even if pratyakṣa is a cognition free 
from conceptual construction which grasps its object as it  is , it is not proper for the cognition of 
truth. According to his epistemology, pratyakṣa arisen from individual objects is ordinary 
cognition; on the contrary, the cognition of truth does not possess any concrete object4. Why then 
did he think that way? 
  This article will try to make clear the reason why Bhāviveka, while regarding pratyakṣa as a 
reliable instrument of cognition (pramāṇa) in this world5, negates it this role in ultimate reality. For 
this purpose, I introduce the argument of pratyakṣa in the 3 rd chapter "Tattvajñānaiṣaṇā" of 
Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā (hereafter, MHK) and his commentary Tarkajvālā (hereafter, TJ6).  
                                                                                                                                    
nyid yin pa ... TJ ad MHKⅢ.27[D61b2-3]  
Tr: [Verse 27] states as follows: [Thesis:] The earth [element] has no solidity as its own nature. [Reason:] 
Because it is material element. [Example:] Just like the wind [element]. [Thesis:] The function of the earth 
[element] is not sustaining. [Reason:] Because it is what is created. [Example:] Just like the water [element]. 
(MHKⅢ .27) It is explained in the world as well as in the treaties of the Abhidharma that the earth [element] has 
solidity as its [own] characteristic, ... 
4 The "object" of the cognition of truth is the emptiness (śūnyatā) and the essence of dharma (dharmatā). Cf. dngos 
po thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid rab tu dben pa'i mtshan nyid kyi stong pa nyid ... mngon sum du byar med pa'i tshul 
gyis mngon sum du byas shing | dngos po thams cad brjod du med par mthong ba'i | ... PP18[D187a3-4]  
Tr: The characteristic of emptiness is to transcend the own nature of all things. For one who experiences it  and 
knows all things ineffably by means of there being nothing to be perceived ... ;  
  stong pa nyid shes pa'i nyi ma'i 'od zer gyis snang bar byas pa'i dngos po thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid la kun tu 
(PCN : du D ) lta zhing | dmigs su med pa la rab tu gnas pa'i ngag dang yid kyi brjod pa ldog pa'i phyir ... 
PP18[D188a1]  
Tr: One [who is engaged in ascetic p ractices] sees through the own nature of all things by the cognition of the 
emptiness just like the sunlight illuminates [the dark], and devotes himself to a mental state beyond cognition. Thus 
he does not experience verbal expression and thinking in his mind ... ;  
  chos nyid dang chos kyi ngo  bo  nyid (DC : nyid lacking in PN) dang | chos kyi rang bzhin zhes bya ba dag ni 
(DN : gi PC) rnam grangs so || PP18[D187a7]  
Tr: The essence of dharma and *dharmasvabhāva and *dharmaprakṛti have the same meaning. ;  
  don tha dad pa ma yin pa zhes bya ba ni chos nyid ro gcig (DPC : cig N) pa'i phyir don dbyer med pa ste | de ni 
de kho na'i mtshan nyid yin no || PP18[D190a5]  
Tr: "Transcending various meanings" means that meaning does not vary so much, because the essence of dharma 
is applicable to [all things in the sense of the emptiness]. This is the characteristic of truth. 
5 Previous studies on Bhāviveka deal with the proof of the absence of things' own nature and the succession of 
epistemology from Dignāga, but do not take up fully his argument that the absence of things' own nature theory 
does not conflict with pratyakṣa and what is commonly cognized (pratīti). Watanabe [1999] deals with 
"invalidations by pratyakṣa and pratīti" in TJ ad MHKⅢ.26 and Ⅲ.176-181. 
6 The author of TJ is transliterated Bhavya in Tibetan, and according to the tradition, is not doubted being identical 
with Bhāviveka. But modern scholars point out some doubts. Ejima [ 1980: 13 -15] regards the present TJ as a 
revised edition in afterages. Saito [2005] argues that the first three chapters of MHK was completed as a set of work 
before another chapters. Watanabe [1999: 156.note9] pays attention to the point that MHK does not express "what is 
commonly cognized" as prasiddha/prasiddhi, but rather expresses it as pratīti, just like Dharmakīrti belonging to the 
later era. Yasuma [2007], on the other hand, regards as authentic work only TJ's first three chapters, because there is 
no difference between MHK and TJ about the explanation of the theory of two t ruths. TJ ad MHKⅢ.176-181 is 
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  In the commentary on verse 26, dealing with direct perception and what is commonly cognized 
(pratīti/prasiddha/prasiddhi), Bhāviveka examines whether pratyakṣa and pratīti invalidate the 
absence/emptiness of things' own nature theory or not . And further down, in the commentary on 
verses 176-181, he argues in detail why pratyakṣa and pratīti are not reliable instruments of 
cognition in ultimate reality. He also deals with the same topics in a more simplified way or from a 
different viewpoint in Prajñāpradīpa (hereafter, PP) and Da Cheng Zhang Chen Lun (大乗掌珍論; 
hereafter, DZh). What is worth paying attention to in the argument of MHK/TJ is that the same 
reason (hetu) Bhāviveka uses to prove the absence of things' own nature, he uses too for proving 
the fictitiousness of pratyakṣa, and by doing so to make clear the fictitiousness of the ordinary 
cognition. 
 
2. The criticism of the absence of things' own nature theory by an imagined opponent 
  In the commentary on verse 26 of the 3rd chapter, Bhāviveka takes up the problem whether 
pratyakṣa and pratīti invalidate the absence of things' own nature theory or not. In order to argue 
about this problem, he introduces an imagined opponent who states that pratyakṣa and pratīti 
invalidate the absence of things' own nature theory. 
[TJ; Opponent's Objection :] 
   Likewise, (1) it is commonly cognized that what the sensory organs operate in relation to their 
own specific objects is direct perception (*pratyakṣa). (2) And there is no instrument of 
cognition (*pramāṇa) superior to seeing. (3) Nevertheless, having seen the shape (*saṃsthāna) 
and colour (*varṇa) of the elements (i.e. earth, water, fire and wind) by your own eyes, you still 
search for their own nature (*svabhāva), firm touch (i.e. the essence of the earth element). And 
also it is understood by  everybody in the world that [the earth element] do the works of 
sustaining (*dhṛti) etc. However, [if y ou] negate them, direct perception invalidates [your 
thesis]. 
   Likewise, (4) this form (*rūpa) etc., and their own nature i.e. solidity, wetness, heat and motion 
etc. are well known even to the Śabara (barbarians) and Caṇḍāla (the lowest tribes). Thus, by 
negating the own nature of things which is well known to everybody in the world, what is 
commonly cognized (*pratīti) invalidates [your thesis] 7. 
                                                                                                                                    
relevant to the 5th chapter, and the examination of pratyakṣa and pratīti is common to PP, DZh. Thus I cannot find 
out any certain problematic part, so I follow the theory of Yasuma. 
7 Cf. de bzhin du yul so sor nges pa la 'jug pa nyid ni dbang po rnams kyi mngon sum yin par grags te | mthong ba 
las lhag pa'i tshad ma gzhan med la | khyed rang nyid kyi mig gis kyang 'byung ba'i dbyibs dang | gzugs dag mthong 
zhing de'i ngo bo nyid kyi reg pa rtsub (DC : brtsub PN) pa dag kyang tshol la 'dzin pa la sogs pa'i bya ba byed pa 
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In TJ, a s quoted above, through an imagined opponent's words Bhāviveka gives a detailed 
explanation about pratyakṣa and pratīti. That is, (1) the direct perception of the sensory organs 
arises separately in relation to the specific objects of each of these organs, (2) there is no instrument 
of cognition superior to experience, (3) each object's own nature is known through the five sensory 
organs. Moreover (4), it is stated that the various nature of things are commonly cognized by all 
people including barbarians and the lowest tribes. In this way, the own nature of things is directly 
perceived through the sensory organs; consequently, pratyakṣa is the most reliable instrument of 
cognition, and moreover, the ordinary people experience the same things, therefore this opponent 
insists that common sense is established8. 
 
3. Bhāviveka on pratyakṣa 
3.1. The theory of two truths 
  Bhāviveka regards the absence of things' own nature theory as a matter of ultimate reality, while 
at the same time he accepts the existence of this nature as a matter pertaining to this world, as a 
worldly matter. This is his theory of two t ruths. If so, what does "worldly" mean? This means 
                                                                                                                                    
'jig rten pa thams cad kyis (DN : kyis lacking in PC) kyang nye bar gzung ba yod bzhin du de dag 'gog pa la mngon 
sum gyis kyang gnod do || de bzhin du gzugs la sogs pa gang yin pa 'di dag dang | de dag gi sra ba dang gsher ba 
dang tsha ba dang g-yo ba la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid gang yin pa dag ni ri khrod pa dang gdol pa yan chad la yang 
grags te | de (DPC : ji N) ltar 'jig rten thams cad la grags pa'i dngos po'i ngo bo nyid bsal (em. : gsal DPCN) bar byed 
pas grags pas kyang gnod do zhe na | TJ ad MHKⅢ.26[D60a3-6]  
8 Similar criticism is found in the 15th chapter of the PP. Cf. mkhas par rlom pa gzhan dag gzhan du phyir zlog par 
byed de | de dag ngo bo nyid gang gis ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du 'dod (DPC : ins. pa N : ins. de Ṭ) || ... ci ste de dag 
rgyu dang rkyen las byung ba'i (DNCṬ : ba P) ngo bo nyid gang yin pa des ngo bo nyid med pa nyid do zhe na ni de 
ni (DCṬ : ni lacking in PN) rigs pa ma yin te | mngon sum dang grags pa'i gnod pas gnod par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro || 
PP15[D157a7-b1]  
Tr: Others who are proud of their knowledge negate [the absence of things' own nature theory] in different way. In 
what essential point, are these [things] accepted as lacking their own nature? ... Or if for them [their] own nature is 
produced from cause and conditions, and by this if you [Bhāviveka] say "[Their] own nature does not exist at all.", it 
is impossible. Because the means of invalidation such as direct perception ( *pratyakṣa) and what is commonly 
cognized (*pratīti) would invalidate [your view].  
  Bhāviveka's answer to this is also based on the theory of two truths. Cf. 'dir bshad pa | don dam par rnam par shes 
pa rnam par brtags pa'i dngos po'i gzugs la dmigs pa'i skye ba khas ma blangs pa'i phyir dang | dngos po yod pa nyid 
bkag pa'i phyir dang | 'jig rten gyi tha snyad ma spangs pa'i phyir mngon sum dang grags pa'i gnod pa med pas kho 
bo cag gi phyogs la gang gis gang la gnod pa yang (DCṬ : yang lacking in PN) med do || mngon sum gyis gnod pa 
yod par ston (DPNC : rtog Ṭ) par 'dod na de yang rigs pa ma yin te | mngon sum du dmigs pa'i dngos po mngon sum 
du yod pa nyid du bstan par bya dgos na de yang ma grub pa'i phyir ro || PP15[D157b1-3]  
Tr: [Bhāviveka] answers about this [criticism]. In ultimate reality, (1) [we] do not accept that cognition arises from 
form (*rūpa) as its object, which is a conceptualized thing. And (2) [we] have already negated the existence of [all] 
things. Then, (3) [we] do not abandon common sense [i.e. consensus] in the world. Therefore, direct perception and 
what is commonly cognized do not invalidate [our view]. Accordingly, in our position nothing invalidates any other 
thing. If [the opponent] attemps to point out that by direct perception there would be invalidation [of the absence of 
things' own nature], it  is not impossible. Because even if the thing as an object of direct perception should be 
explained as existence as long as it is perceived, [in ultimate reality,] it does not exist. 
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custom, usual or ordinary activity (vyavahāra)9 and common truth (saṃvṛtisatya)10. 
  In this way, because he accepts the absence of things' own nature only in ultimate reality, he 
thinks that accepting pratyakṣa and pratīti involved in the cognition of things in this world do not 
invalidate his theory in any way11. Accordingly, pratyakṣa is a reliable instrument of ordinary 
cognition. Answering to the said opponent, he criticizes pratyakṣa and pratīti as follows: 
[TJ; Bhāviveka's Answer :] 
    Because [our] thesis has the qualification "in ultimate reality" (*paramārthataḥ), ... there are 
no invalidations (*bādhā) ... by *pratyakṣa and *pratīti/prasiddha. ... 
    There is also no invalidation by * pratyakṣa. It is because (1) the objects [of cognition] are 
unreal and (2) the sensory organs are senseless (*jaḍa), hence the ability of seeing etc. [really] 
do not exist. (3) Even so, a person with eye-disease [sees] the appearance of a hair, a bee and a 
mosquito etc. or [a person hears] an echo. In this way, what is directly perceived (*pratyakṣa) 
is subjective (*abhimāna). Therefore, if [one] directly perceives something somewhere, by this, 
invalidation will occur. 
    Moreover (4), there is also no invalidation by *pratīti/prasiddha. Because the ordinary person 
                                            
9 Bhāviveka explains that the own nature of things is accepted commonly and that it is grasped in usual activity 
(vyavahāratas).  
Cf. samāhitamatiḥ paścāt prajñayaivaṃ parīkṣayet |  
   yo 'yaṃ svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ gṛhyeta vyavahārataḥ || (MHKⅢ .21)  
   vicāryamāṇas tu dhiyā kim ayaṃ paramārthataḥ | (MHKⅢ .22ab)  
Tr: After [his] intelligence (mati) is concentrated, [a yogin] should examine as follows with [his] insight: This 
own nature of things is grasped in usual activity. (MHKⅢ .21) While analyzing with [his] intelligence (dhī), 
[he considers] "How is this [possible] in ultimate reality?" (MHKⅢ .22ab) 
10 Cf. tha snyad kyi sgo nas gzung bar bya ba kun rdzob kyi bden pa'i tshul gyis rnam par gzhag (DC : bzhag PN) 
pa'i chos sa dang chu dang me dang rlung la sogs pa rnams kyi dngos po sra ba dang gsher ba dang tsha ba dang 
g-yo ba la sogs pa 'di dag la shes rab kyis 'di ltar brtag par bya'o || TJ ad MHKⅢ.21[D58a7-b1]  
Tr: [A yogin] should examine, with [his] insight, these natures, i.e. solidity, wetness, heat, motion, etc., which are 
the [nature] of dharmas such as earth, water, fire and wind etc. These [nature] are grasped in usual activity, i.e. 
established by the method of the common truth (*saṃvṛtisatya). 
11 Also in the DZh, Bhāviveka nagates the existence of things in ultimate reality, and accepts it in this world. Cf. 眞
性有爲空如幻縁生故。此中世間同許有者。自亦許爲世俗有故。世俗現量生起因縁亦許有故。眼等有爲世俗諦攝。
牧牛人等皆共了知。眼等有爲是實有故。勿違如是自宗所許。現量共知。故以眞性簡別立宗。眞義自體説名眞性。
即勝義諦。就勝義諦立有爲空。非就世俗	 DZh[T268c7-13]	 
Tr: " [Thesis:] In truth, conditioned things are devoid of [their own nature]. [Example:] Just like an illusion. 
[Reason:] Because [these are] arisen from conditions." Among them, we also accept the things whose existence is 
accepted commonly in the world, and regard them as common existences. [And then,] direct perception of the 
ordinary people regards [the eyes etc.] as existence, for [the eyes etc.] are cause and conditions of arising [of direct 
perception]. Therefore conditioned things such as eyes etc. are included in the common truth. [In this way,] since 
cow herders etc. commonly cognize conditioned things such as eyes etc. as existence, the above points that our 
thesis has already accepted would not conflict with direct perception and what is commonly cognized. Hence, with 
"in truth" distinguishing [the ultimate truth from the common truth], we advance our thesis. When we explain the 
meaning of truth itself, we call this case "in truth". That is ultimate truth. According to the ultimate truth, we state 
"conditioned things are devoid of [their own nature]." Not according to the common truth.	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is blind due to cataract in the sense of ignorance. Hence, w hen it comes to examine [the 
absence of things' own nature] from the viewpoint of ultimate reality, he [i.e. the ordinary 
people] does not understand [it], just as a blind person cannot examine jewels to be examined. 
Accordingly, there is no invalidation by *pratīti/prasiddha12. 
In the above TJ, Bhāviveka criticizes pratyakṣa as not being reliable in ultimate reality in terms of 
(1) their own specific objects being unreal, (2) the sensory organs lacking their ability of perception, 
and (3) pratyakṣa can be subjective such as a phenomenon that a person with eye-disease sees the 
appearance of a hair, a bee and a mosquito etc., or a person hears an echo. Therefore, Bhāviveka 
concludes that (4) even if dependent upon pratīti as a shared content of what is directly perceived 
with others, it is not reliable. Accordingly, Bhāviveka replies that pratyakṣa and pratīti can be 
neither an instrument to invalidate the absence of things' own nature nor an instrument to attain the 
truth. 
 
3.2. The object of pratyakṣa is cognized commonly. 
  According to Bhāviveka, pratyakṣa and pratīti do not bring about true cognition in ultimate 
reality. But in this world, pratyakṣa is accepted as arising from its object such as elements 
(paramāṇu) and bringing about true cognition. The nature of each element is to be an aggregate 
(samūha/saṃghāta)	 of eight entities (aṣṭadravya), i.e. eight kinds of different elements such as 
earth, water, fire, wind (four material elements; mahābhūta), form, odor, taste and touch (four 
composite elements; bhautika)13. And when elements of the same kind accumulate (saṃcita), this 
                                            
12 Cf. bshad pa (PN : bshad par bya ste DC) don dam par zhes sam bcas pa'i khyad par yod pa'i phyir ... mngon sum 
dang grags pa'i gnod pa med do || (DC : de | PN) ... mngon sum gyis gnod pa yang med de | yul rnams log pa yin pa'i 
phyir dang | dbang po rnams blun pa yin pa'i phyir mthong ba la sogs pa'i nus pa (DPN : pa lacking in C) med pa 
(DC : pa lacking in PN) bzhin du yang rab rib can la skra dang sbrang ma dang sbrang bu la sogs pa snang ba lta bu 
dang | brag ca la sogs pa ltar mngon sum du (DN : du lacking in PC) yang mngon pa'i nga rgyal yin pas de'i phyir 
gang la ci zhig mngon sum du gyur na des gnod par 'gyur | grags pa'i gnod pa yang med de | gang gi phyir 'jig rten na 
(DC : ni PN) mi shes pa'i ling tog gis (DC : gi PN) mdongs pa yin pas don dam par dpyad pa'i skabs su de ni nor bu 
rin po che brtag pa dag la dmus long ma brtags pa bzhin du mi rtogs pas grags pa'i gnod pa med do || TJ ad MHK
Ⅲ.26[D60a6-b3] 
13 According to Tamura [2008: 176], this view relates to the theory of eight entities' simultaneity in Abhidharma. 
The theory of eight entities' simultaneity is Sarvāstivādin's thought that all matters consist of several kinds of 
rūpa-dharma. They think that when elements arise, at least eight entities never fail to arise simultaneously. Cf. 
rūpiṇāṃ tu dharmāṇām ayaṃ niyamaḥ. kāme 'ṣṭadravyako 'śabdaḥ paramāṇur anindriyaḥ | (II.22ab) sarvasūkṣmo 
hi rūpasaṃghātaḥ paramāṇur ity ucyate. yato nālpataro vijñāyeta. sa kāmadhātāv aśabdako 'nindriyaś cāṣṭadravyaka 
utpadyate, nānyatamena h īnaḥ. aṣṭau dravyāṇi catvāri mahābhūtāni catvāri copādāyarūpāṇi 
rūpagandharasaspraṣṭavyāni. AKBh52.20-53.1.  
Tr: Dharmas belonging to rūpa have following determination. In the Kāma[-dhātu], elements except sound and 
sensory organ, [arise simultaneously] as eight entities. (II.22ab) That is to say [in this verse], the elements mean 
an aggregate of extremely minute rūpa[-dharmas i.e. an aggregate of elements, and do not mean an isolated one]. 
Because [ an isolated element] smaller than that [their aggregate] cannot be cognized. In the Kāma-dhātu, this 
[aggregate of rūpa-dharmas] except sound and sensory organ, arises simultaneously as eight entities, thus none of 
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conglomerate is perceived as a jar etc14. In this way, the own nature of elements is grasped as an 
aggregate of eight entities and as a  conglomerate of the same kind15. On the other hand, when 
things of the different kind like people or trees gathered at a distance, it is also called an aggregate. 
But even if these things are called troops or forest in common or conventional expression, these are 
apparent beings (prajñaptisat). Hence, Bhāviveka thinks that their own nature cannot be grasped16. 
 
3.3. Pratyakṣa is not the supreme instrument of cognition. 
  In the above explanation of pratyakṣa and pratīti based on  the theory of two truths, Bhāviveka 
explained briefly the reason why these are negated in ultimate reality, but did not explain it in detail. 
In MHK/TJⅢ.176-181, Bhāviveka takes up again the problem dealt with in the commentary on 
verse 26, arguing here more clearly the reason of negation.  
  In MHKⅢ.176, he first introduces an opponent's criticism that there is no instrument of 
cognition superior to pratyakṣa.  
    A possible objection (cet) : A  jar etc. is perceived as produced. Reasoning (hetu) has no 
role to play in relation to what is perceived. [If you prove by reasoning] in this way, the 
invalidation by what is perceived (dṛṣṭa) and by what is commonly cognized (pratīti) 
becomes something that invalidates it [the reasoning]17. (MHKⅢ .176) 
                                                                                                                                    
them is lacking. What are then eight entities? These are four material elements and four composite elements such as 
form, odor, taste and touch. 
14 Cf. kho bo cag ni rdul phra rab rigs mthun pa'i bsags pa bum pa la sogs pa nyid dang phra rab kyang kun rdzob 
pa'i rdzas su 'dod de | 'di ltar rdul phra rab ni rdzas brgyad 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin pas | de yang rdzas nyid yin par 
'dod la | de bzhin du bum pa la sogs pa 'dus pa'i bdag nyid kyang rdzas nyid yin te | 'ba' zhig pa ni rdzas su ma grub 
pa'i phyir ro || TJ ad MHKⅤ.35[D209b4-5]  
Tr: We accept both a conglomerate (*saṃcita) of elements of the same kind such as a jar etc. and [each] element as 
common existence ( *sāṃvṛtadravya). That is to say, since the elements have the nature of being an aggregate 
(*saṃghāta) of eight entities, so [we] accept these [elements] as existence. And likewise, [we accept] the jar etc. 
which has the nature of being an aggregate [of the same kind of element] as existence. It is because an isolated 
[element] does not come into existence. 
15 Cf. Tamura	 [2008: 175-176] 
16 Cf. bsags pa dang 'dus pa zhes bya ba gnyis la khyad par ci yod ce na | rdul phra rab rigs mthun pa dag gzhi gcig 
la brten pa ni tshogs pa zhes bya'o || glang po che dang | rta la sogs pa dang | skyed pa dang | seng ldeng la sogs pa'i 
rdzas rigs mi mthun pa gzhi tha dad pa 'dus pa la dmag dang nags tshal la sogs par gdags pa ni 'dus pa zhes bya'o || 
TJ ad MHKⅤ.38[D210a6-7]  
Tr: What is then the difference between a conglomerate and an aggregate? When elements of the same kind have the 
same supporting base, it is called "conglomerate". But when, when dissimilar things with different supporting bases 
such as elephants, horses, harita trees and khadira trees etc. aggregate, and names such as troops or forest are given 
to them, it is called "aggregate". ;  
  In the proof of the absence of four material elements' own nature in MHK/TJⅢ.26-39, the difference between 
conglomerate and aggregate is not explained. 
17 Cf. jātā ghaṭādayo dṛṣṭā dṛṣṭe hetur nirarthakaḥ |  
	 	  dṛṣṭapratītibādhaivaṃ bādhikā bhavatīti cet || (MHKⅢ .176) 
According to Ejima [1980: 468.note71], dṛṣṭa in MHKⅢ.176-178 means pratyakṣa in TJ. 
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According to TJ, the opponent's criticism means the following: (1) Things arise compositely from 
cause and conditions. (2) People perceive a phenomenon such as the arising of things and there is 
no instrument of cognition superior to pratyakṣa. (3) Since all people have a common experience, 
common sense can be established. (4) Reasoning has no role to play in negating pratyakṣa18. 
  To this, Bhāviveka replies in MHKⅢ.177 as follows:  
    The arising of a jar etc. is perceived by a cognition which i s common to that of the 
ignorant person. We do not negate such [a view]. Therefore, there is no deficiency as 
stated above19. (MHKⅢ .177) 
In other words, because pratyakṣa is common to a knowledgeable person and to an ignorant one, 
Bhāviveka does not negate the perception of arising of things; but this cognition is not that of truth. 
  In TJ, it is explained that pratyakṣa is a common experience to people with regard to the 
following points: there is no explanation whether things arise from themselves, from others, from  
both themselves and others or without any cause at all, and no explanation neither whether things 
are beings or non -beings. In other words, pratyakṣa is not a conceptual cognition 20 . This 
                                            
18 Cf. zhes bya ba ni gal te kha cig 'di skad ces | bum pa la sogs pa dag 'jim pa dang dbyug gu dang 'khor lo dang 
srad bu dang chu dang | rdza mkhan gyi 'dod pa la sogs pa'i rkyen rnams kyis (DC : kyi PN) mngon par bsgrubs 
(DP : bsgrub CN) pa skyes pa yin par mig la sogs pas mthong bas dbang po rnams kyis mthong ba de la ni khyod 
kyis smras pa'i (DC : i lacking in PN) gtan tshigs don med de | gang gi phyir zhe na | mthong ba las (DC : bas PN) 
lhag pa'i tshad ma gzhan med pa'i phyir te | gang zhig ba lang la rva med de | srog chags yin pa'i phyir rta bzhin no 
zhes zer ba de la mngon sum gyi gnod  par 'gyur ba bzhin du khyod la yang (DC : yang lacking in PN) re zhig de 
bzhin du 'gyur ro || de bzhin du ri khrod pa yan chad dang gdol pa yan chad dang ba lang rdzi yan chad la yang 'di 
lta ste | bum pa la sogs pa dag skyes par grags pas de'i phyir khyod la grags pa'i gnod par yang 'gyur ro zhe na | TJ 
ad MHKⅢ.176[D99b2-6]  
Tr: [Verse 176] means as follows: If one [an opponent] states as follows: "[We] perceive with [our] eyes that jar 
etc. are produced, arisen from cause and conditions such as clay, stick, wheel, thread, water, potter's effort etc. 
Thus, concerning the cognition [caused] by sensory organs, you[r] [Bhāviveka's] stated reasoning (hetu) is useless. 
The reason is that there is no other instrument of cognition superior to perception. If one states as follows: [Thesis:] 
Cows do not have horn. [Reason:] Because they are animals. [Example:] Just like horses, direct perception will 
invalidate this. Likewise, [direct perception will invalidate] you[r reasoning] at once. In the same way, even Śabara, 
Caṇḍāla and cow headers commonly understand jar etc. as being produced just as [we] mentioned above. 
Therefore, what is commonly cognized will also invalidate you[r reasoning]." 
19 Cf. dṛṣṭaṃ janma ghaṭādīnāṃ bālasāmānyayā dhiyā |  
     pratiṣedhas tathā nāyaṃ nāto doṣo yathoditaḥ || (MHKⅢ .177) 
20 Cf. ces bya ba ni bum pa la (DCN : la lacking in P) sogs pa'i skye ba bdag dang gzhan dang gnyi ga dang rgyu 
med pa dang | yod pa dang med pa la sogs pa dpyad pa dang bral ba sgyu ma dang smig rgyu dang | dri za'i grong 
khyer la sogs pa'i skye ba snang ba lta bu'i (DPC : 'i lacking in N) byis pa'i skye bo'i blo dang mthun par mthong 
ba de ni kun rdzob kyi tshul du yod pas byis pa'i blo dang mthun par mthong ba  de ni ma bkag ste | 'di ltar don 
dam pa ba'i blo rtog pa'i skyon gyi (DC : gyis PN) dri ma ma lus pa spong bar bzod pas brtags na mi rigs par bstan 
pas de'i phyir mngon sum dang grags pa'i gnod  pa ji skad smras pa'i skyon med do || TJ ad MHK
Ⅲ.177[D99b6-100a2]  
Tr: [Verse 177] means as follows: About the arising of jar etc., there is no explanation whether things [arise from] 
themselves, from others, both themselves and others or without any cause at all, and no explanation neither whether 
[things are] beings nor non-beings. It is equivalent to the arising i.e. the appearance of illusion, mirage and the city 
of Gandharva. [We] perceive it by a cognition which is common to that of the ignorant person, but that 
[cognition] exists in an ordinary sense. Thus, [We] do not negate the perception common to that of the ignorant 
person. In short, when [we] examine the intelligence of ultimate reality by the accomplishment of entire removal of 
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explanation implies that pratyakṣa is a cognition free from conceptual construction. Although 
pratyakṣa is free from conceptual construction, sa feeble distinguishing function "svabhāvavikalpa" 
remains in it. Dealing with pratyakṣa as a cognition free from conceptual construction in the 
commentary on verse 26cd of the 5th chapter, Bhāviveka accepts Dignāga's definition of 
pratyakṣa21. This indicates that the cognition at the stage of pratyakṣa does not separate into 
cognitive subject and cognitive object, and that it lacks conceptualization and recollection22. 
According to the Yogācāra school and Dignāga, the content of pratyakṣa is ineffable and its verbal 
expression is given afterward, at the stage of conceptual cognition. Accordingly, even though 
pratyakṣa has the function " svabhāvavikalpa", it is regarded as a cognition free from conceptual 
construction. 
 
3.4. Pratyakṣa does not arise in ultimate reality, it arises in this world. 
  Replying to his opponent comprehensively in MHKⅢ.177, Bhāviveka then points out one by one 
the problems of pratyakṣa23. In MHKⅢ.178, under the qualification "in truth", based upon the 
                                                                                                                                    
stains i.e. erroneous conceptual construction entirely, [perception of the arising] turns out to be unreasonable. 
Therefore, there is no deficiency as stated above such as invalidation by direct perception and what is commonly 
cognized. 
21 Cf. note3. TJ ad MHKⅤ.26cd[D207a4-5]; About Dignāga's definition of pratyakṣa, Cf. note2. 
22 According to Kajiyama [ 1982: 48 ], Miyamoto [ 2008: 142 -143], ibid. [2010: 102-103], Dignāga's theory of 
pratyakṣa used by Bhāviveka goes back to Vasbandhu (ca.320〜380). Vasbandhu regards the sensory cognitions 
with "svabhāvavikalpa" as being free from conceptual construction in terms of lacking conceptualization and 
recollection. Cf. yadi pañca vijñānakāyāḥ savitarkāḥ savicārāḥ, katham avikalpakā ity ucyante. 
nirūpaṇānusmaraṇavikalpenāvikalpakāḥ | (I.33ab) trividhaḥ kila vikalpaḥ. svabhāvābhinirūpaṇānusmaraṇa- 
vikalpaḥ. tad eṣāṃ svabhāvavikalpo 'sti. netarau. tasmād avikalpakā ity ucyante. yathā ekapādako 'śvo 'pādaka iti. 
tatra svabhāvavikalpo vitarkaḥ. sa caitteṣu paścān nirdekṣyate. AKBh22.18-22 ad AKI.33ab. 
Tr: If the assemblage of five cognitions [the cognitions by sensory organs] has the property of direct knowledge and 
analytical thinking, why are [these five cognitions] called being free from conceptual construction? [These five 
cognitions are] free from conceptual construction in terms of [lacking] conceptualization and recollection. 
(I.33ab) According to the [Abhidharmic] tradition, the conceptual construction is threefold, namely svabhāvavikalpa, 
conceptualization (nirūpaṇavikalpa) and recollection (anusmaraṇavikalpa). Thus, these [five cognitions] have 
svabhāvavikalpa, but do not have another two [functions]. Therefore, it is said that [five cognitions] are free from 
conceptual construction. Just like [ it is said that] a horse with one leg has no leg. Among those [ three kinds of 
conceptual construction], svabhāvavikalpa is direct knowledge. We will explain this afterward in the [explanation 
of] mental functions. ; 
  Bhāviveka also takes up svabhāvavikalpa as one of the three kinds of conceptual construction in the 25th chapter 
of the PP. Cf. ngo bo nyid dang | rtog pa dang | rjes su dran pa rnam par rtog pa dag kyang rnam par shes pa dang | 
'du byed kyi phung por gtogs pa'i phyir ro || PP25[D242b5] 
Tr: Because svabhāvavikalpa, conceptualization and recollection are included in the aggregate of formations 
(*saṃskāraskandha) and that of consciousness (*vijñānaskandha). 
  PPṬ explains svabhāvavikalpa as follows: Cf. ngo bo nyid kyis rnam par rtog pa ni sgo lnga'i rnam par shes pa 
nye bar gnas pa las byung ba yin la | PPṬ25[D276b4]  
Tr: *Svabhāvavikalpa is the cognitional function of five sensory organs arisen from present things. 
23 Cf. de ltar spyir lan btab nas | da ni khyad par brjod par bya ste | 'di la mngon sum du smra bas ni re zhig mngon 
sum nyid (DCN : mngon sum nyid lacking in P) mngon sum gyi sgo nas (DC : na PN) nges par gzung (PN : bzung 
DC) nas de'i gnod pas brgal bar bya ba yin na mngon sum yang kun rdzob pa yin pas don dam pa ba ma yin no || ji 
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non-arising of cognition, Bhāviveka negates that the cognition which directly perceives its object is 
self-cognized ( svasaṃvedya). Self-cognition means cognition ( cognitive action) which cognizes 
itself without any cognitive subject such as ātman etc. In the case of Bhāviveka, unlike the 
Yogācāra school, cognition is the appearance and the effect of its object as its cause. Therefore, the 
self-cognition means direct and strictly individual (sva) awareness of the image of its object24. In 
MHKⅢ.178, Bhāviveka states as follows: 
    In truth, a cognition which has form as its object (ālambana) does not exist as to be 
self-cognized ( svasaṃvedya). It is because the invalidation by that [ direct perception] 
would not be an invalidator on account of non-arising of the [cognition] 25. (MHKⅢ .178)  
In TJ, Bhāviveka maintains the non-arising of cognition in ultimate reality; on the other hand, he 
does not negate its arising of it ordinarily. In TJ, Bhāviveka explains as follows: 
   The following is a summary; [We] have already explained that both the cognized [object] and 
[cognition] operating i.e. arising in relation to it do not exist. The aggregate of formations 
(*saṃskāraskandha) is motionless. (1) The sensory organs are completely senseless ( *jaḍa). 
Hence, (2) [the sensory organs] cannot grasp their own specific objects as a single [entity]. And 
(3) the cognition arisen from the aggregate [elements] is also common [cognition] (*sāṃvṛta). 
Therefore, if something would be pratyakṣa of another thing, then it would be an invalidator for 
us26. 
Among these reasons, the following wordings correspond to another part in MHK/TJ.  
  (1) The sensory organs are senseless. : TJ ad MHKⅢ.26 
This means the negation of the functions of s ensory organs from the point of view of ultimate 
                                                                                                                                    
ltar zhe na | TJ ad MHKⅢ.178[D100a2-3]  
Tr: After having negated briefly in this way, [we] explain [the problems of pratyakṣa] more in detail as follows: If, 
in this regard, one maintains that the direct perception is established by the very direct perception and criticizes [us] 
by this invalidator [direct perception], [we answer that] direct perception is a worldly matter, and not a matter of 
ultimate reality. It is because ... 
24 Cf. Hoornaert［2000: 110.note3］; Contrary to the Yogācāra school of thought, Sautrāntika's theory negates that 
cognition is divided into cognitive subject and cognitive object. According to Saito [2008a: 137-138], the gist of 
MHKⅤ.26 is as follows: Cognition is indivisible. Because its cognitive object is a conglomerate of elements, its 
instrument of cognition is cognition possessing the appearance of its object, and its effect is arising of cognition. Cf. 
tannirvṛttau ca dṛṣṭatvāt tannirvṛttiḥ phalaṃ matam | (MHKⅤ.26ab) 
Tr: When it [ cognition possessing the appearance of its object[ is arising, [ its cognitive object] is perceived. 
Therefore, the arising of it [cognition possessing the appearance of its object] is accepted as its effect.  
25 Cf. na rūpālambanā buddhiḥ svasaṃvedyāsti tattvataḥ |  
     yato no na hi tadbādhā bādhikā tadajātitaḥ || (MHKⅢ .178) 
26 Cf. shes bya dang de la 'jug pa skye ba med par bstan pa'i phyir dang | 'du byed kyi tshogs g-yo ba med pa'i phyir 
dang | dbang po  rnams blun pa nyid kyi phyir gcig gis yul 'dzin pa (DC : par PN) yang mi nus la | tshogs pa las 
byung (PN : byang DC) ba'i blo yang kun rdzob pa yin pa'i phyir gang zhig gang gi mngon sum du 'gyur na des kho 
bo la gnod par 'gyur zhes don bsdu ba ni de yin no || TJ ad MHKⅢ.178[D100a3-4] 
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reality27. 
  (2) The sensory organs cannot grasp their own specific objects as a single entity. : MHK/TJⅢ.27, 30 
This is obvious through the proof of the absence of things' own nature. More clearly, this is so 
because by accepting just by custom the property of being an aggregate of elements constitutive of 
any thing, it is impossible to establish the own nature/characteristic of this aggregate as a single 
entity28. 
  (3) The cognition arisen from an aggregate is a common one. : TJ ad MHKⅤ.35 
This means that Bhāviveka accepts, in the ordinary sense, the existence of things made from 
elements and does not negate pratyakṣa arisen from them29. 
  As mentioned above, the reasons pointed out in MHK/TJⅢ.178 are concordant with the proof of 
the absence of things' own nature and the explanation of common cognition argued in other places. 
                                            
27 Cf. note12. TJ ad MHKⅢ.26[D60a6-b3] 
28 Cf. kharasvabhāvā na mahī bhūtatvāt tadyathānilaḥ |  
     dhāraṇaṃ na bhuvaḥ kāryaṃ kṛtakatvād yathāmbhasaḥ || (MHKⅢ .27)  
zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras te | 'jig rten dang chos mngon pa la sogs pa'i bstan bcos las sa'i mtshan nyid ni sra ba 
nyid yin pa las ni brtan (DC : brten PN) par byed par bstan pas de dag dgag pa'i (DC : pa'i lacking in PN) phyir 
tshad ma rnam pa gnyis nye bar bkod de | gang gi phyir chu dang me dang rlung las logs shig na sa zhes bya ba 'ga' 
yang yod pa ma yin te | 'dus pa'i ngo bo nyid dag las sa'i mtshan nyid logs shig tu bkar te bstan par ni ji ltar yang mi 
nus la | las kyi bye brag kyang de bzhin pas de'i phyir ngo bo nyid yod pa ma yin no || TJ ad MHKⅢ.27[D61b2-4]  
Tr: [Verse 27] states as follows: [Thesis:] The earth [element] has no solidity as its own nature. [Reason:] 
Because it is a material element. [Example:] Just like the wind [element]. [Thesis:] The function of the earth 
[element] is not sustaining. [Reason:] Because it is what is created. [Example:] Just like the water [element]. 
(MHKⅢ .27) It is explained in common treatises as well as in the treatises of the Abhidharma that the earth 
[element] has solidity as its [own] characteristic, and that the function [of the earth element] is sustaining. 
Therefore, in order to negate them, two kinds of instruments of cognition are established [by us]. Because there is 
no such thing as earth [element] apart from [the aggregate of] water, fire and wind [elements], it is impossible to 
pick the own characteristic of earth [element] out and express it from [the things] having the nature of being an 
aggregate. And the same applies to their respective functions. Accordingly, there is no [respective] own nature [of 
earth, water, fire, wind]. ; 
    evaṃ jalānilāgnīnāṃ na dravādisvabhāvatā |  
    yujyate nāpi tatkāryaṃ saṃgrahavyūhapaktayaḥ (MHKⅢ .30)  
zhes bya ba ni chu la sogs pa dag kyang thams cad 'byung ba chen po bzhi'i rgyu las byung ba yin te | de dag thams 
cad la sra ba dang gsher ba dang tsha ba dang yang ba nyid yod pas de dag gi rang gi mtshan nyid 'ba' zhig pa rnam 
par gzhag (DC : bzhag PN) pa ni bstan par dka'o || las kyang thams cad la cha mnyam par yod de kha cig la lhag par 
snang ba ni rnam par rmongs pa bskyed pa yin no || gang gi phyir de dag gi rdul phra rab kyang 'dus pa'i ngo bo nyid 
de | sa dang chu dang me dang rlung dang gzugs dang dri dang ro dang reg pa zhes bya ba rdzas brgyad 'dus pa yin 
pas de'i phyir gang gis so so la ngo bo nyid dang las rnam par gzhag (DCN : bzhag P) par bya ba'i mtshan nyid 'ba' 
zhig pa ni gang la ci yang med la | las 'ba' zhig pa yang gang la ci yang med do || TJ ad MHKⅢ.30[D61b7-62a4] 
Tr: [Verse30] states as follows: Likewise, water, wind and fire do not have fluidity etc. as their own nature. 
Nor are their respective functions cohesion, displacement and ripening. (MHKⅢ .30) Water etc. are all 
composite things made from the four material elements (*mahābhautika). Because all of them are endowed with 
solidity, wetness, heat and mobility, it is difficult to determine their respective own characteristic. The function of 
one [element] are also present in all other ones, but [a particular function] is dominant in a particular [thing]. This 
gives rise to an illusion [of a particular function to a particular element]. The reason is that the elements of these 
[composite things] have the nature of being an aggregate, and eight entities i.e. earth, water, fire, wind, form, odor, 
taste and touch are an aggregate. Therefore, there is no isolated characteristic whatsoever in no [element] wherein 
an [isolated] own nature and function are established. And there is neither no isolated function whatsoever nowhere. 
29 Cf. note14. TJ ad MHKⅤ.35[D209b4-5] 
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3.5. Since anyone can experience erroneous cognition, pratyakṣa is not reliable. 
  In MHK/TJ179, based on the example of erroneous cognition, Bhāviveka remarks that pratyakṣa 
is not reliable. 
    [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, it is impossible at all that perceptual cognition comforms to 
its object. [Reason:] Because [perceptual cognition of a knowledgeable person (*ārya)] 
does not differ from that cognition of an ignorant person. [Example:] Just like the 
cognition of a circle for a [revolving] fire-brand. (MHKⅢ .179) 
    That is to say, "because [perceptual cognition] does not differ from that cognition of an 
ignorant person" means that, in terms of being self-cognized, ineffable and free from 
conceptual construction, [the perceptual cognition] does not differ between an ignorant person 
and a knowledgeable one. It is because [perceptual cognition] has as its own specific object a 
thing whose own nature is but a mere appearance. Just like the cognition which appears as a 
circle for a [revolving] fire-brand is free from conceptual construction30. 
In conclusion, TJ explains that perceptual cognition of an ignorant person and that of a 
knowledgeable one does not differ in terms of being self-cognized, ineffable and free from 
conceptual construction. These three characters of pratyakṣa correspond with Dignāga's view31. But 
for Dignāga, pratyakṣa is a reliable cognition; on the other hand, for Bhāviveka it is not the 
cognition of truth. Because, for him, even if it is a cognition free from conceptual construction, it is 
possible to be erroneous cognition. Just like a revolving fire-brand is erroneously cognized as a fire 
circle32. In this way, when erroneous cognition arises, the fire-brand is not perceived as true object. 
The above is the fictitiousness of pratyakṣa. 
 
 
                                            
30 Cf. naiva pratyakṣadhīr yuktā yathārthā paramārthataḥ |  
     bālabuddhyaviśiṣṭatvād alāta iva cakradhīḥ || (MHKⅢ .179)  
zhes bya ba la || byis pa'i blo dang khyad med phyir || zhes bya ba ni rang rig pa nyid dang bstan du med pa nyid 
dang | rnam par rtog pa med pa nyid ni byis pa dang | 'phags pa'i blo la khyad par med pa'i phyir ro || dngos po rang 
gi ngo bo snang ba tsam gyi spyod yul dang ldan pa'i phyir | mgal me la 'khor lor snang bar gyur pa'i blo rtog pa 
med pa bzhin no || TJ ad MHKⅢ.179[D100a5-7] 
31 Cf. āhuś ca dharmiṇo 'nekarūpasya nendriyāt sarvathā gatiḥ | svasaṃvedyam hy anirdeśyaṃ rūpam 
indriyagocaraḥ || (I.5) evaṃ tāvat pañcendriyajaṃ pratyakṣajñānaṃ nirvikalpam. PSV3.1-4 ad PSI 
Tr: Further, we hold that: a thing possessing many properties (rūpa) cannot be cognized in all its aspects by the 
sense organs. The object of the sense organs is the form ( rūpa) which is to be self-cognized and which is 
ineffable. (I.5) Thus, in any case, direct perception arisen from the five kinds of sensory organs is free from 
conceptual construction. 
32 Watanabe [1999: 162] indicates that the erroneous cognition of a revolving fire-brand would be false perception 
(pratyakṣābhasa). In Dharmakīrti's late epistemology, the erroneous cognition of a revolving fire-brand is regarded 
as wrong cognition without conceptual construction. Cf. Katsura [1989: 536] 
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3.6. The object of pratyakṣa is fictitious. 
  In MHK/TJⅢ.180ab, Bhāviveka maintains that the object of pratyakṣa is fictitious. 
    [Thesis:] Moreover, [the form] which is the object of that [direct perception] is not a real 
entity. [Reason:] Because it is what is created. [Example:] Just like the cognition of ātman. 
(MHKⅢ .180ab) 
    That is to say, [in ultimate reality] the ineffable form which is the object of perceptual 
cognition is not a real entity. Because it is what is created. Just like the cognition of 
ātman33. 
According to TJ, the real entity means ineffable form (rūpa). Dignāga considers this form to be the 
very object of pratyakṣa34. Why then does this kind of real entity not exist? The reason given by 
Bhāviveka is "because it is what is created". In the commentary on verse 26, he uses this reason 
from the viewpoint of ultimate reality, in order to negate the object which is regarded as "existing" 
on the worldly level. So he applies it to the object which has the property of being finite such as 
possessing cause35. Likewise, he thinks the object of cognition and the object of expression ― 
even if the latter is expressed "ineffable" ― correspond to what is created i.e. what is possessing 
cause. The reason "because it is what is created" is then applied to the apparent beings. 
  In the following MHK/TJⅢ.180cd, Bhāviveka negates both pratyakṣa and its object, regarding 
them as fictitious. 
    And, because form etc. is not a really existing substance, direct perception would not be 
an invalidator for us. (MHKⅢ .180cd) 
    That is to say, form etc. made from an aggregate of eight entities and the cognition which has 
the [form etc.] as its object are not really existing substances, just like the cognition of 
troops and forest etc. Therefore, as mentioned above, direct perception does not exist [in 
                                            
33 Cf. nāpi tadgocaraṃ vastu saṃskṛtatvād yathātmadhīḥ | (MHKⅢ .180ab) 
zhes bya ba ni mngon sum gyi blo'i spyod yul gyi gzugs bstan du med pa yang dngos po ma yin te | 'dus byas yin 
pa'i phyir bdag gi blo bzhin no || TJ ad MHKⅢ.180ab[D100a7] 
34 Cf. note31. 
35 Cf. byas pa  zhes bya ba ni rgyu dang rkyen rnams kyis mngon par bsgrubs pa'o || de'i dngos po ni byas pa nyid 
de (DPN : do C) | ... gtan tshigs kyi rnam grangs gzhan bstan pa'i phyir rgyu ldan sogs phyir (PN : phyir lacking in 
DC) zhes bya ba smras te | rgyu ldan zhes bya ba ni 'di la rgyu yod pa'i phyir rgyu dang ldan pa'o || rgyu dang ldan 
pa'i dngos po ni rgyu dang ldan pa nyid do || sogs pa zhes bya ba'i sgras ni dngos po nyid dang | shes bya nyid dang 
| brjod par bya ba nyid la sogs pa'i gtan tshigs gzhan dag kyang gzung ngo || TJ ad MHKⅢ.26[D61a1-7]  
Tr: "What is created (kṛtaka)" means what is produced ( *abhinirhṛta) by cause and conditions. Its abstract noun 
(*bhāva) is kṛtakatva, ...  In order to point out another synonym for the notion of reason, [ Bhāviveka] states: 
"Because [earth element etc.] possessess its cause etc.". Since "possessing cause" means "this thing has its cause", 
[this thing] is called "hetumat". Its abstract noun of possessing cause is hetumattva. The term "etc." includes the 
other reasons such as beingness (*bhāvatva), cognizableness (*jñeyatva) and expressileness (*vācyatva) etc. 
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ultimate reality]. Accordingly, this invalidator [i.e. pratyakṣa] does not exist for us36. 
TJ negates the fact that the form, constituted as an aggregate of eight entities, really exists as a 
single unitary entity. In this explanation, concerning the reason "because it is what is created" 
maintained in MHKⅢ.180ab, TJ gives it a new meaning, that is "because it is not a really existing 
substance". In this way, things which possess the property of being an aggregate of elements and 
pratyakṣa arisen from them correspond to the apparent beings such as troops and forest37. 
Accordingly, both are regarded as fictitious. The above is the argument about pratyakṣa. 
 
3.7. Pratīti is fictitious. 
  At last, in MHKⅢ.181, Bhāviveka states that in this world wise men are not bound by pratīti. 
    Moreover, what is commonly cognized does not invalidate the investigation done by the 
method of wise men (vidvān). The words of blind people because of their covering of 
ignorance do not aim at truth38. (MHKⅢ .181) 
TJ compares the wise men to people whose eyes discern the emptiness, and the ordinary people to 
the innate blind and people with eye-disease. TJ then explains that the wise men understand the 
absence of things' own nature; on the contrary, the ordinary people, obedient to pratīti, imagine 
things and distinguish them diversely39. This means that pratīti of the ordinary people relies on their 
                                            
36 Cf. adravyatvāc ca rūpādeḥ pratyakṣaṃ no na bādhakam || (MHKⅢ .180cd)  
ces bya ba ni gzugs la sogs pa rdzas brgyad 'dus pa dang | de la dmigs pa'i blo dag ni dmag dang nags (DC : nag PN) 
tshal la sogs pa'i blo bzhin du rdzas su yod pa ma yin pas de ltar mngon sum med pa'i phyir | kho bo cag la de'i 
gnod pa med do || TJ ad MHKⅢ.180cd[D100b1-2]  
37 Cf. note16. TJ ad MHKⅤ.38[D210a6-7] 
38 Cf. vidvannītivicāraṃ ca na pratītiḥ prabādhate |  
     nāvidyāpaṭalāndhānāṃ tattve 'dhikriyate vacaḥ || (MHKⅢ .181) 
39 Cf. dper na mig thogs pa med cing dri ma med pas yongs su btags pa'i don rin po che ma rga da dang | bai d'u rya 
la sogs pa rin po che brtag (DPC : brtags N) pa dag la dmus long rnams dang | rab rib kyis (DC : kyi PN) mig nyams 
pa rnams kyi skabs ma yin gyi | de la blo gsal ba dang mig dang ldan pa rnams kyi skabs yin pa de bzhin du | stong 
pa nyid kyi lta ba'i mig sman gyis yong su sbyangs pa'i rigs pa dri ma med pa'i mig yangs pa dang ldan pa'i mkhas 
pa rnams kyi skabs yin gyi | ma rig pa'i ling tog gis rmongs pa dang | dngos po'i rang gi ngo bo mthong bar mi nus 
pa (PN : par DC) rab rib can dang (DC : dang lacking in PN) 'dra ba khams gsum pa'i dngos po sna tshogs la rtog 
(DCN : rtogs P) pa yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun tu (PN : du DC) rtog pas kun nas bslang ba'i dri mas blo gros kyi 
mig dkrugs pa mi mkhas pa rnams kyi tshig gi skabs med pas grags pa'i gnod par 'gyur re skan | TJ ad MHK
Ⅲ.181[D100b3-6]  
Tr: For example, with regard to the jewels such as emerald and cat's-eye as an object to be appraised by the eyes 
without injury or dirt, these are outside the domain of innate blind people and people with eye-disease. These are the 
domain of intelligent people and people with eyesight. Likewise, the eyes which can see the emptiness (śūnyatā), the 
reason purified by treatment and the undefiled eyes are the domain of people with wide wisdom. But the words of 
confused people because of their covering of ignorance and ignorant people do not aim at [truth]. Because they 
cannot see the thing itself (*bhāvasya svarūpa), just like the people with eye-disease. And because they distinguish 
various things belonging to three world (*traidhātuka), and whose eyes are confused by dirt arisen from 
conceptualization of non-existence. Therefore, what is commonly cognized does not invalidate [the investigation 
done by the method of wise men] at all. 
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sensory organs and pratyakṣa, so that they cannot notice such fictitiousness. The above is the 
argument about pratyakṣa and pratīti in MHK/TJⅢ.176-181. 
 
4. Conclusion 
  As shown above, Bhāviveka accepts Dignāga's definition of pratyakṣa. Consequently, he 
maintains that pratyakṣa perceives the own nature/characteristic of things and that it is a cognition 
free from conceptual construction. But for Bhāviveka, pratyakṣa is not proper for the cognition of 
truth. This is so because from the viewpoint of ultimate reality, pratyakṣa arisen from its object is a 
cognition of false image. That is why for the knowledgeable person and the ignorant one alike it is 
possible to experience erroneous cognition. On the other hand, pratyakṣa is accepted as reliable 
common cognition, just like common sense is established among the ordinary people. Accordingly, 
Bhāviveka's thesis such as the absence/emptiness of things' own nature ―  if without the 
qualification "in ultimate reality" ― results in conflict with pratyakṣa and pratīti. Related to this 
problem, and indicating the fictitiousness of its object whose nature is to be an aggregate of 
elements, Bhāviveka concludes that pratyakṣa is also fictitious.  
  In conclusion, in his epistemology pratyakṣa and the cognition of truth must be strictly 
distinguished in terms of their own objects. 
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